The central European panic of the spring 1931 is often presented as a cause of the sterling crisis of September. But what was the precise transmission channel? This paper proposes to explore how financial troubles on the continent affected Britain's financial system and currency. The freezing of central European assets was at the origin of a liquidity shock for London merchant banks because of their activity as acceptors/guarantors of commercial bills on account of German merchants. New balance sheet data are used to quantify the shock on various institutions. I then explore 1) how the various financial institutions reacted to the shock and 2) how the liquidity crisis transformed into a sterling crisis.
London's illiquidity, I argue, was the by-product of the merchant banks' activity as guarantors of short-term commercial debt on account of German merchants through a specific financial instrument: the bankers' acceptance. During the credit boom of the late 1920s, the weakly capitalized merchant banks had guaranteed bills for foreign merchants on an extensive basis because this activity did not necessitate them to immobilize resources, and therefore allowed them to earn substantial income. At the end of the 1920s, the amounts of the bills they had insured largely exceeded the value of their capital. This was not a problem in normal times because defaults on the side of merchants remained limited. However, just as the burst of the housing bubble affected the liquidity of monoline insurers during the recent crisis, an economic shock provoking substantial defaults among foreign merchants could at any time endanger the position of London banks. In the summer of 1931, exchange controls in central Europe and the Standstill agreements, by imposing a freezing on all assets, resulted in the effective default of all borrowers from this region. Since merchants could not honor their sterling debts anymore, the liability for these debts fell upon their guarantors in London. The result was a liquidity shock on largely exposed financial institutions.
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In this paper, I first document the extent of the shock on London banks. I then describe the banks' reactions to the shock. The crisis was followed by a drastic shrinkage of balance sheets. Fears that some institutions might fail resulted in a run on these banks. London acceptance houses were forced to liquidate their assets in order to meet their liabilities. They also severely restrained commercial credit over subsequent years. In the high-frequency, short-term interest rates surged in the interbank market, as banks started holding cash in anticipation of their liquidity needs. But the Bank of England immediately put a halt to this situation. In July, the Bank engaged in open market operations so as to stabilize the interbank rates. For this purpose, it had to print additional money and the limit of the fiduciary issue 10 Schnabel and Shin (2004) have emphasized the role of acceptances in transmitting the financial crisis of 1763 from Amsterdam to Hamburg and Berlin. Note however that the channel they are considering is the reverse from those at play in 1931. In this episode indeed, it is the Amsterdam acceptance houses that failed in the first place, making all subsequent discounters of the acceptances, and ultimately, borrowing Berlin merchants, liable to the bills' holders. A more relevant analogy is with the recent financial crisis, where troubles have been extensively propagated to institutions having sold credit default swaps on Collateralized Debt (or Mortgage) Obligations.
was removed. Evidence from exchange rates quotations and from the gold reserve shows that the Bank's move was crucial in provoking the collapse of the pound. Therefore, as in recent models of twin crises, a conflict of goals at the central bank level was responsible for the transmission of the banking problems into a speculative attack.
11 British monetary authorities clearly chose between financial stability and the gold standard.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the mechanism through which the German crisis transformed into a liquidity crisis in London. Section 3 presents data on London banks' balance sheets and exposure to central Europe. Section 4 describes the extent of the liquidity shock endured by London banks. Section 5 analyzes subsequent movements in the banks' balance sheets.
In section 6, I describe movements in the interbank market in the weeks preceding and following the German crisis. I also look at the Bank of England's interventions on this market and relate its actions to the position of the currency. Section 7 concludes.
The transmission channel
There are many possible channels through which a financial crisis can transmit from one country to another but the most obvious one is through direct exposure of the banking sector. When considering the effect of the central European crisis on the London financial system, previous scholars have mainly emphasized two elements. First, London banks held large amounts of claims on the crisis region, particularly on Germany. These assets were immobilized in July 1931 as a consequence of exchange controls and the Standstill agreements. 12 Second, the financial houses also had huge foreign liquid liabilities which would have made them particularly vulnerable in the event of a shock. 13 The combination of freezed portfolios on the one hand and liquid foreign deposits on the other would have led the City to its illiquidity in the wake of the 1931 financial crisis.
11 See Chang and Velasco (2000) . 12 Williams (1963, p. 524) writes that "British short-term assets in Germany amounted to L. 70 m. and these were now effectively immobilized.", adding that this triggered "the possibility of a breakdown of British banking." James (2001, p. 71) writes that "Foreign exposure was the Achilles' heel of the London City" and that some institutions "had committed themselves heavily to central Europe". See also Einzig (1932) , Truptil (1936) , Morton (1943) , Balogh (1947) and Forbes (1987) . 13 Williams (1963, p. 520): foreigners held relatively large amounts of easily realizable British securities.", James (2001, p. 69): "Britain and the United States were vulnerable because of their position in the international capital markets as major short-term debtors. Britain was the first to be hit by the panic."
This explanation would require some clarifications though. First, it is not clear why foreign liabilities should have made the banks more vulnerable to a shock on their portfolio. If London financial houses were in troubles, all depositors should have withdrawn their balances from them, independently of their origin. Second, it is not obvious either why the German Standstill should at all have led to a run on the banks. The Standstill agreements stipulated that loans to German debtors would still pay interest and that they would be reimbursed after some delay; they were just turned from short-term to long-term (Harris, 1935, pp. 25-26) . No loss was incurred as a consequence of the crisis. London banks could keep reporting their loans at nominal value on their balance sheets and continue operating. In the absence of fears for their long-run solvency, depositors had no reason to precipitate a run. A possible explanation is that they were in fact running out of the currency. In that case however, the causality would have run from the exchange troubles to the banking troubles, and not the other way around. I report evidence below that concerns over the currency cannot account for the pattern of deposits withdrawals from London banks during the year 1931.
What I suggest instead is that the nature of London banks' exposure to central Europe was different from mere portfolio exposure. In order to see this, one needs to enter into the details of these houses' activity. In fact, portfolio holdings of central European debts only accounted for one sixth of the London merchant and clearing banks' exposure to this region in 1931. But the banks were exposed through a specific credit instrument: the bankers' acceptance.
14 Bankers' acceptances had been extensively used by merchants since centuries for financing their trade activities (Chapman, 1984, Schnabel and Shin, 2004 ).
In the 1920s, they were still the main channel of trade finance. The principle, illustrated in figure 1 , was very simple. Suppose a merchant from country A had sold goods to an importer from country B, and was to be paid after some delay. For example, payment might have occurred at the goods' delivery. Now, suppose country A's merchant wanted to benefit from the proceeds of her sale before receiving payment.
A possibility for her was to draw a bill on country B's importer (using the shipped goods as collateral), and then, discount the bill on the London market. However, potential lenders in London were not willing to lend to a merchant on which they had no information. They required a guarantee. A London bank could assume this function of guarantor by "accepting" the bill, that is, by putting its signature on it, in 14 At the end of July 1931, German claims of London banks amounted to 64.7 million pounds, of which 53.5 million were acceptances (Archives, Bank of England, OV34/132, but see also Forbes (1987) as well as Richard Sayers' own estimates kept in Archives, Bank of England, ADM33/21). In the latter file, Sayers also estimated the total value of London's Austrian Standstill claims at 1 million pounds in August 1931. I was not able to find an estimate of the total amount of Hungarian Standstill claims before September 1933, at which date the remaining amount held was of 4.8 million pounds, of which 3.8 million were acceptances (Archives, Bank of England, OV33/84 and Sayers' estimates in the files ADM33/21.) exchange for a fee (figure 1. I.). Country A's merchant agreed to pay the fee in order to have her bill discountable on the market. Once arrived at maturity, the bill's holder could ask for payment at the accepting house, which in turn, received payment from the importer (figure 1.II.). Acceptances were similar to the modern Credit Default Swaps in that they only represented a contingent liability for the banks. Indeed, an accepted bill represented a bank's liability to the bill's holder, but this liability was always exactly matched by a corresponding claim on an importer. The banks reported the amount of the bills they had accepted on both sides of their balance sheets (figure 2). Liabilities and claims were maturing at the same date and were secured by a commercial transaction: they were "self-liquidating" (Greengrass, 1930 , Vigreux, 1932 . Therefore, the acceptance business did not require to immobilize funds, and banks could accept bills to a large extent, relative to their capital.
This specific nature of the acceptance activity made it particularly attractive to the London merchant banks. These houses indeed, unlike the large joint-stock clearing banks, were characterized by their low level of capital and deposits. In the nineteenth century, merchant bankers had an almost monopoly on the activity. In the postwar years however, they had to face two adverse trends: first, the competition with the New York market (Baster, 1937) , and second the competition with the clearing banks, which were increasingly occupying this field (Roberts, 1991, p. 171 York as not "so conveniently situated", and he declared: "its discount market is nothing approaching ours." 17 Acceptance houses were also able to face the competition with the clearing banks because the kind of services they provided was slightly different. Clearing banks usually relied on foreign banks as intermediaries in their acceptance activity: they provided credit lines on which these banks' customers could draw. The customers' debts, in these cases, were guaranteed by the intermediaries. 18 In contrast, merchant bankers, because of the large connections they had maintained abroad since they settled in London in the nineteenth century, were able to deal directly with foreign merchants. Moreover, in the reconstruction years, the demand for commercial credit from central European countries, particularly
Germany, was huge. The acceptance business therefore remained a substantial source of revenues for merchant banks.
But as recalled by the recent financial crisis, insuring credit also carries risks, and London banks had to manage them carefully. In case of an importer's default at the bill's maturity (a failure to proceed to operation 6a on figure 1), the accepting house, in its quality of guarantor, remained liable to the bill's holder. Usually, acceptance houses affected a part of their commission revenues to the coverage of the losses. The central European banking and exchange crises however, were a major shock to the general scheme because they resulted in the default of a much larger fraction of borrowers than acceptance houses were usually prepared to face. Exchange controls and the Standstill Agreements had rescheduled the reimbursement of merchants' debts and the houses that had guaranteed these debts had to assume them in the meantime. An immediate consequence was therefore to turn all London banks' contingent liabilities with respect to central European credit into real ones (Truptil, 1936 
Merchant banks
As opposed to the joint-stock banks, private banks were not required to publish their balance sheet.
However, material on their position can still be found in various archival records. First, the Bank of England's Discount Office was collecting detailed information on most of the merchant banks on an annual basis. All institutions willing to "maintain the status of their acceptance as Prime Bank Paper"
were required to report periodically at the Bank (Balogh, 1947, p. 309 In contrast to the Discount Office's reports, these alternative sources do not disclose the amounts of the banks' investments in central Europe. However, this information can again be found elsewhere.
Roberts (1991) and Diaper (1986) (Truptil, 1936 , Balogh, 1947 , Diaper, 1986 , Roberts, 1991 and acceptances were at that time the main instrument used for trade finance. Given the characteristics of the instrument described above, one should expect the credit boom to have been associated with considerable risk-taking behavior by the banks. Indeed, it was in the very nature of acceptances that they could be granted without need for additional resources. Accepting houses did not have to worry about raising more capital or debt (and about the costs associated with it) for financing their booming activity. As for their general exposure, the only rule they were submitted to was their own, self-imposed prudential rule. Yet several elements shall lead us to mitigate this statement.
First, there is evidence that the Bank of England was carefully monitoring the merchant banks. Most of the data on which this paper relies actually owe their existence to the Bank's monitoring activity. The
Bank was discriminating between the financial houses when choosing the paper eligible for rediscount or for direct purchases. For instance, bills carrying the signature of London Merchant Bank, Ltd., though eligible for rediscount, were not accepted for direct purchases by the Bank as part of its open market operations. 27 The reason invoked for this situation was that the house did not have sufficient capital.
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Moreover, there also existed a market mechanism through which the banks were incited to prudence:
their bills would hardly find their way on the discount market if bill brokers came to doubt their solvency.
Merchant bankers understood the necessity to manage risks. According to Sir Robert Kindersley, a director of Lazards, acceptance houses willing to preserve the quality of their signature had to show they had "considerable means at [their] back" in order to face potential defaults. 29 An unwritten rule, according to Kindersley, was that a house's acceptances should never exceed three or four times the value of its capital and reserves. 
Acceptance houses' illiquidity
In this context, a major shock such as the central European crisis could potentially impair the liquidity of merchant banks. Figure The great heterogeneity across London banks can be well explained through both the nature of their business and the geographical area of their activities. For instance, the core of the clearing banks' activity consisted in making direct loans to domestic industry and households, and they only marginally engaged in the acceptance business.
32 This is reflected in the ratio of their acceptances to capital, which remained at the low level of 0.62 at the end of 1928 (figure 4). Other houses, like Morgan Grenfell, were more engaged in bonds issuance than in acceptances (Burk, 1989) . Barings were largely exposed to acceptances at the peak of the credit boom but the firm had considerably increased its capital between 1928 and 1931.
Among the acceptance houses, the geographical distribution of operations also greatly differed. Ruffers had particular connections with France (through their partner in Lyons) and Spain (Truptil, 1936) .
Morgans had strong relationships with the United States, where the firm's partners were located (Burk, 1989 ) and also tried to diversify their operations (Truptil, 1936) . Hambros were primarily known for their connections with Scandinavian countries (Truptil, 1936) . For these houses, the share of central European 31 The Economist, 18 July 1931. 32 Sir Robert Kindersley stated that: "the acceptance business insofar as the joint-stock banks are concerned is a side line, if I may use the expression. The acceptance houses, on the other hand, are there primarily to do that business; they concentrate on it and it is their first business." (Macmillan Committee, 1931, Minutes of Evidence, vol. 1, p. 72, par. 1162).
acceptances remained low. 33 In contrast, Kleinworts were traditionally engaged in German business since the second half of the nineteenth century and their activity in this country expanded considerably in the 1920s, due in particular to connections with the German textile industry (Diaper, 1986 ). In the post-war years Schroders had made substantial efforts to reactivate their German operations as well. Relying on their close connections with the firm Schroder Gebruder in Hamburg, the house responded to the high demand for credit on the side of German merchants. Schroders guaranteed a substantial amount of bills for Hamburg industrial firms and developed close relations with the Deutsche Bank (Roberts, 1991) .
Last, London Merchant Bank was in close collaboration with the German Commerz und Privat Bank.
These latter institutions were among the most gravely affected by the central European shock. 33 Only 4% of Ruffers' outstanding acceptances were drawn on central European merchants at the end of 1931. Morgans and Hambros had respectively 17% and 32% of their acceptances claims blocked in this region. 34 In 1931, Kleinworts, Schroders and London Merchant Bank had respectively 45%, 54% and 74% of their acceptances frozen in central Europe. 35 Schnabel (2009) looks at the heterogeneity across banks in order to discern between currency and banking causes of the German crisis of 1931. See also Schnabel (2003) . In contrast, Wigmore (1987) focuses on the time-series and relies on daily data for the Federal Reserve's gold losses for identifying the cause of the US bank holiday of 1933. 36 Standstill exposure is measured as in figure 5 . 5 Banks' reaction to the shock
Fire Sales
How did banks react to the liquidity shock? In this section, I track down the symptoms of the liquidity crisis in the London banks' actions, as revealed by their balance sheets. To begin with, the banks' liquid assets are examined. Figure 8 shows the amounts of bills and securities appearing on their balance sheets. It is apparent that several houses reduced this item quite dramatically in the year 1931.
Indeed, the same pattern emerges as for the deposit losses. 
Credit crunch
Finally, the volume of new commercial credit guaranteed by London financial houses in the wake of the central European crisis is considered. In the reports they made to the Bank of England's Discount
Office, merchant banks were required to indicate the amounts of Standstill acceptances remaining on their balance sheet at the end of each year. These amounts correspond to short-term debts granted to central European customers before the crisis and that were subsequently rolled over. The information they provide allows to discern, in the amounts of outstanding acceptances, between the part corresponding to newly issued bills and the part being merely old credit renewed. Figure 10 shows this repartition for the few institutions on which the reports are available. Considering the gray part of the bars, it is evident that the volume of new credit guaranteed by the banks declined steeply after 1931.
This trend has important implications. Indeed, since acceptances were the main instrument of trade finance, the decline in their issuance must somehow have impacted international trade. Looking at the total estimates of bills guaranteed by London banks for the year 1928, I was able to establish that around 14% of world exports were financed through London acceptances. 37 Figure 11 reports a strong correlation between the annual value of world exports in the years 1924-1935 and the corresponding amounts 37 According to Maddison (1995) , the total value of world exports amounted to 6669 million pounds in 1928. At the end of the year, the value of outstanding London acceptances was estimated by the Bank of England at 232 million pounds (Archives, Bank of England, C47/301, "Acceptances"). The large majority of acceptances were of three months maturity, and we should therefore multiply this value by four in order to obtain the value of the yearly issuance. This gives an amount of bills of 928 million pounds granted for the year 1928. This corresponds to 14% of the volume of world trade.
of acceptances guaranteed by a sample of 14 London banks. 38 Of course, this correlation does not imply causation and it is rather likely that the trends in the two series were both due to a common cause. For instance, the economic depression as well as restrictive trade policies were certainly causes of the fall in world trade, which in turn affected the demand for commercial credit.
However, here again, the heterogeneity across banks offers an identification strategy for determining whether the decline in the volume of credit was caused by supply-side factors as well. Indeed, the fall in the demand for credit should have impacted all banks homogenously. By contrast, figure 12 as well as the bottom part of table 1 report suggestive evidence that the decline in credit was heterogenous across banks. Table 1 shows the results of a regression of the decline (between 1930 and 1933) in banks' newly accepted bills 39 on their initial Standstill exposure. Although we should be extremely cautious when interpreting the results of a regression based on so few data points, it seems that the banks that were the most impacted by the Standstill were also those that cut credit the most in the following years. The constant of the regression emerges as highly significant and its value can be interpreted as the decline in credit due to factors unrelated to the central European crisis (in other words, it corresponds to the decline in credit that would have been observed for a bank with zero exposure to the Standstill). The estimate suggests that these other causes can account approximately for a 50% decline in credit. For the sample on which information is available, the total decline observed between 1930 and 1933 was 72% instead.
London merchant banks' activity mainly consisted in gathering information about international merchants/borrowers. In doing so, the banks were specialized in specific regions of the world where they had accumulated long-time expertise dating back to the nineteenth century. Therefore, the acceptance houses' need to shrink their activity was equivalent to a loss of this accumulated human capital and it certainly resulted in a decrease in the overall quality of trade credit intermediation. 40 The acceptance business owed its very existence to the information assymmetry that existed between a merchant and her 38 The banks included are the ten clearing banks, Hambros, Morgan Grenfell, Kleinworts and Schroders and were chosen for reasons of data availability. Since the great majority of bills accepted were of three months maturity, the amounts of outstanding acceptances appearing on these banks' year-end balance sheets have been multiplied by four for estimating the total amounts of bills guaranteed yearly. Note that all acceptances, including the Standstill ones, are considered here. Due to data limitations, I have not been able to reconstitute the volume of newly issued bills for a sufficiently representative sample during the years 1924 to 1935. For the years after 1931, the amounts of acceptances retained are therefore an upper bound for the volume of new credit granted. However, this problem should result in an underestimate of the relationship only, since the years 1931 to 1935 were also characterized by small value of world exports. 39 For Lazards, the decline in credit is measured between 1930 and 1935. 40 The argument developed here is a trade finance version of Bernanke's (1983) theory that banking panics in the United States had a real welfare impact during the 1930s. lender and it was by nature non-competitive. Therefore, merchants could probably not turn to another bank in order to obtain the signature that their house could not offer them anymore after the central European crisis. The outcome is that several "good" borrowers might have found themselves in a position where they could not obtain credit anymore and the whole process is likely to have been associated with substantial welfare losses. The losses are of course difficult to quantify, first because of the limited data available and second, because they were not confined to Britain but distributed among borrowers all over the world. However, the analysis developed above suggests that there might indeed have been credit constraints on international merchants after 1931.
London Merchant Bank, Ltd.: A case study
The conclusions drawn from balance sheet data are also supported by strong qualitative evidence that London acceptance houses were trying to shrink their balance sheets in the months and years that followed the central European crisis, and that, for doing so, they were liquidating their assets and restricting further credit. Harter, a director of London Merchant Bank, explained that the difficulty encountered on the discount market persisted. Moreover, he mentioned "a further decrease in liquidity, the quick assets being reduced by some 100,000 pounds in order to pay off deposits" (see figure   6 and 8). The National Provincial Bank granted 100,000 pounds in discounts facilities to the bank, but
Harter doubted that this would be sufficient at all. In January 1932, the Bank of England noticed that the acceptance house was constrained to carry a substantial part of its own acceptances on its portfolio.
In February, the Governor met the directors and urged them to "reduce commitments where possible I considered short-term interest rates quotations on bankers' drafts as well as Treasury bills. The high frequency is clearly crucial here, as we will see that important movements were taking place in a few days. Figure 13 plots the rates on 3-months bankers' drafts and T-bills against time, together with the Bank of England's official discount rate. Assuming that the Bank was ready to rediscount paper without restriction at the current Bank rate, the latter can be considered as an upper bound for the market rate of discount. Market rates were usually located at approximately 0.5% below the official rate.
On figure 13 however, it appears that the Bank rate stopped being effective in the week just preceding the announcement of exchange controls in Germany (from 7 to 15 July). The spread between the Bank and market rate narrowed dangerously during these days and was close to zero when the German 42 Archives, Bank of England, C48/93. moratorium was declared (15 July, see table 2 ). This situation is indicative of a shortage of money in the banking system. In contemporaries' words, the market was not far from being "into the Bank", which means that the point was soon reached where it would have been advantageous for discount houses to directly discount their paper at the Issuing Institute. These tensions in the interbank market seem to have been caused by rising expectations of capital controls on the continent. The Economist reported that most dealers were quoting higher rates due to concerns about the German situation. 43 Interestingly, the rise in quoted rates was more pronounced for bank bills than for T-bills. Indeed, while raising the general need for liquidity, the German moratorium also had the consequence of increasing the risk of failures of several acceptance houses, thus reducing the quality of their paper.
But the situation in the interbank market also very soon stabilized. As of 15 July, when the moratorium was declared, the Bank rate started being effective again ( figure 13 ). This might seem surprising as the banks' liquidity troubles became real as of this date. To understand how this could arise, one needs to have a look at the Bank of England's balance sheet. Figure 14 shows the weekly evolution of the aggregate of four of the balance sheet's items in which the Bank was registering the amount of bills purchased on the market. 44 The stabilization of market rates exactly coincided with an increase in the Bank's securities. The Bank appears to have directly intervened to re-establish the effectiveness of its discount rate, through the means of open market operations. Between 15 July and the suspension of gold convertibility, 30 million pounds of securities were purchased. The interventions were mentioned at several occasions by The Economist 45 and the newspaper related them to the "considerable stringency in the money market" and to the necessity to "widen the margin between market rate and Bank rate".
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The operations were probably not sufficient to completely resolve the liquidity crisis at play. They only 43 The Economist, 11 July 1931: "uneasiness as to the German situation, in view of the continued drain on the Reichsbank's foreign exchange resources led most dealers quoting a full 1 7/8 per cent."
44 The items are the Issue Department's "Government Debt and Securities" and "Other Securities" and the Banking Department's "Government Securities" and "Securities". In contrast to the "Discounts and Advances" item, which was reporting the amount of bills rediscounted by customers at the official Bank rate, the items considered here correspond to the bills purchased on the open market. In the evidence he gave to the Macmillan Committee, Sir Ernest Musgrave Harvey, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England made it clear that the different items of the Bank's balance sheet did not correspond to different types of assets but to the different ways through which the Bank had acquired these assets: "I ought to make this point clear that "Government Securities" includes Treasury Bills, that is, Treasury Bills bought by the Bank where the Bank initiates a transaction. If a Treasury Bill is brought in by anybody for discount at the Bank it is treated as a discount and goes into "Discounts and Advances"" 45 The Economist, "The Money Market", 25 July: "Early in the week the Bank tried to relieve the position by open market purchases of bills (...) and the increase shown in the Bank return (...) in Government securities suggests that buying took place upon a substantial scale"; 1 August: "This would have created considerable stringency in the money market had not the Bank of England bought bills heavily both this week and last." ; 8 August: "the open market policy of the Bank, which this week took the form of substantial purchases of September bills". 46 The Economist, "The Money Market", 25 July.
amounted to fifty percent of the total of London banks' Standstill acceptances 47 and these houses also had to face deposits withdrawals. Hence, the Bank had to raise the discount rate twice on 23 and 30
July, while it continued intervening. However, the amounts involved were not negligible either. It is very probable that they contributed to relieve the pressure on the acceptance houses, and helped to avoid banking failures in London.
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The timing of the speculative attack
The Bank's efforts to provide liquidity to the banking system are also likely to have had an impact on the exchange rate. Officials at the Bank of England were very much aware of this mechanism, which the Deputy-Governor Ernest Harvey described in 1929 in the following terms: "when we are urged to create credit (...), we have always got to bear in mind the position of the exchanges and their tendency, whether it is weak, whether the additional creation of credit is likely perhaps (...) to weaken the exchanges to a point at which, having created 5,000,000 pounds of credit, we may lose it or a good deal of it in gold." This finding casts doubt on the thesis that the British economy had fallen victim of a "Bankers'
Ramp". 56 According to this view, representatives of the City would have pressed for costly macroeconomic 51 For example Krugman's (1979) seminal model of balance-of-payment crisis depicts how a two-sided policy of continuous credit creation and exchange rate targeting eventually results in a speculative attack.
52 The reference currency is the French franc here since it was the most credible currency of the gold exchange standard period. See Accominotti (2008) for details.
53 On the Bank of England's exchange market interventions, see Sayers (1976) and Cairncross and Eichengreen (2003) . These findings are in line with accounts of the attack made by contemporaries (Einzig, 1932 , Morton, 1940 ) and historians (Sayers, 1976 , James, 2001 ).
I did not intend to argue here that financial contagion was the unique cause of the sterling collapse, nor that it can account for all aspects of the crisis. For instance, my emphasis on the central European events does not offer a fully satisfactory explanation for why the Bank of England did not raise its interest rate much more aggressively in the summer of 1931. Several reasons might explain this attitude. First, a high Bank rate was likely to divert business from the merchant banks, and from the City in general, since merchants always preferred to discount their acceptances in financial centers where low interest rates prevailed (Greengrass, 1930 , Rist, 1931 . Second, a rise in the Bank rate would also have increased the service of Treasury bills for the British government (Greengrass, 1930 ). This could have deteriorated an already critical fiscal position, therefore undermining the efforts to defend the parity. Last, monetary authorities might also have wanted to avoid the repercussions of a restrictive monetary policy on the unemployment rate. Therefore, previous explanations emphasizing the budget deficit (Williamson, 1984 (Williamson, , 1992 Finally, this paper has interesting implications for the current financial crisis. First, it illustrates the role of credit insurance instruments in propagating liquidity problems during a period of high default rates. From this perspective, acceptances then were not very different from Credit Default Swaps now in propagating and magnifying the effects of the financial crisis. Second, at a time when central banks have never been so active in attempting to stabilize the banking systems, the sterling crisis allows to draw important lessons for the role of monetary policy in achieving economic recovery. Since now more than twenty years, a substantial body of research has shown that leaving the gold standard was the right thing to do for countries wanting to find the path to economic recovery during the 1930s. The mechanism traditionally emphasized is that devaluation offered the opportunity to reflate the economy and stimulate industrial activity (Eichengreen, 1992 , Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985 
II. Bank of England's balance sheet
The Economist. Bank of England's total securities (in million pounds). Weekly, April-December 1931. Note: Total securities correspond to the sum of Issue Department: "Government Securities" and "Other Securities" and Banking Department: "Government Securities" and "Securities". Source: The Economist.
